This article deals with the issue of responsibility in international criminal law in light of John Searle’s philosophy as well as Thomas Lubanga decision at the International Criminal Court. In the first section, we analyze the declaration of criminal responsibility in function of Austin and Searle’s theory, considering it as an illocutionary act the meaning of which depends upon a specific institutional framework. We show, in the second section, how this framework can be construed as a paradigmatic example of Searle’s construction of social reality, especially in virtue of how mind, language and society interact. As far as we are concerned, concepts such as collective intentionality, status functions attributions and deontic powers are crucial to understand that link. Indeed, as we argue in the third section, the systems of deontic powers associated with international law, such as the International Criminal Court, not only elucidate international criminal courts, but also the imprescriptibly of crimes against humanity. International agreements that promote and protect human rights, which deal with the imprescriptibly of those crimes, are addressed in the final section, where we also show a number of reflections upon the Lubanga trial.